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THE INNOCENT OWNER DEFENSE TO REAL
PROPERTY FORFEITURE UNDER THE
COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT: DOES
KNOWLEDGE EQUAL CONSENT?
I. THE PROBLEM
A. Introduction
In 1984, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970
was amended to provide for real property forfeiture in the event that the property is
found to be used or intended to be used in the furtherance of narcotics transactions.1
This potent provision, however, carves out an exception to its broad reach, stating that:
no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of
an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been
committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.2
The phrase "knowledge or consent" has proven unclear. In the process of interpreting
this phrase the circuits have split. Some courts have held that an owner must prove
both lack of knowledge and lack of consent to establish his "innocent" status, while
other courts have held that a lack of consent, despite knowledge, can prevent forfeiture
under the statute.
The majority view, favored in the Second and Third Circuits, is that knowledge
and consent deserve independent consideration in determining an owner's status. The
Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, supports the minority view and argues strongly that
an owner with knowledge of his property's connection to illegal activity cannot be
deemed "innocent."
This article analyzes each side of the debate 'and determines, in accord with the
majority view, that an owner with knowledge should be able to prevent forfeiture by
demonstrating a lack of consent. This article also proposes a statutory revision which
would clarify that knowledge and consent deserve independent consideration.
B. The Split
Although the innocent owner defense is less than ten years old, it appears that
most circuits have either firmly decided the issue or have avoided the question alto-
gether. The split is not likely to simply disappear, and, therefore, needs to be addressed
and resolved.
Speaking through the retired Justice Powell, last year the Fourth Circuit set forth
a standard for determining consent as it relates to the innocent owner defense.3 This
1. 21 U.S.C. §§ 881-904 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
2. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
3. United States v. 31 Endless St., No. 92-1609, 1993 WL 441804 (4th Cir. Nov. 2, 1993)
(Reported in Table Case Format at 8 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 1993)).
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standard considers consent separately from knowledge: "Consent, for the purposes of §
881(a)(7), is 'the failure to take all reasonable steps to prevent illicit use of the premis-
es once one acquires knowledge of that use .. .."" In the Fourth Circuit, not only are
the two elements considered distinct, but it is obvious that one who possesses knowl-
edge will not necessarily be found to have consented.
Recently, the Ninth Circuit implicitly affirmed its support of the opposite view.
In United States v. 10936 Oak Run Circle,' the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the
word "consent" is included in the relevant statute, but, nonetheless, proceeded to base.
its entire analysis on the owners' knowledge. The court reasoned that "innocence is
incompatible with knowledge that puts the owner on notice that he should inquire
further."6
Still other circuits - the Fifth and Seventh, for example - perhaps feeling
unsure where to stand, have refused to take a stance at all.' To make matters worse,
even the United States Supreme Court does not appear willing to decide the issue. Just
this year it heard a case directly involving the innocent owner defense; yet, it managed
to dodge the "knowledge or consent" question.8
As long as the split persists, it will promote unfair outcomes and uncertainty.
Two identically situated landowners, one in the Third Circuit and one in the Ninth,
stand to receive drastically different treatment. Even though it is certainly possible for
a landowner to have knowledge of, but not consent to, drug use on her property,9 one
such landowner might lose all her real property while another is permitted to keep it.
Furthermore, it is also feasible that a Third Circuit landowner who has tried less
than diligently (but sufficiently to satisfy the factfinder) to stop narcotics use on his
property will receive the benefit of the defense, while a Ninth Circuit owner, who has
done everything in his power to remedy the illegalities, will not. Both of these unjust
outcomes are accentuated when considered in relation to another problematic question
- whether a full parcel, or just that portion of it which was connected to the drug use,
can be forfeited. Although this and other controversies surrounding the innocent owner
4. Id. at 3.
5. 9 F.3d 74 (9th Cir. 1993).
6. Id. at 76.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Lot 9, Block 2 of Donnybrook Place, 919 F.2d 994 (5th Cir.
1990); United States v. 7326 Highway 45 North, 965 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992).
8. See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S.Ct. 1126 (1993). In Buena Vista, the Court
held, inter alia, that the innocent owner defense is not limited to bona fide purchasers. Justice Stevens,
speaking for the majority, determined that "(t)his Court need not resolve, inter alia, the parties' dispute
as to the point at which guilty knowledge of the tainted character of property will deprive a party of
an innocent owner defense, because respondent has assumed the burden of convincing the trier of fact
that she had no knowledge ...." Id. at 1129.
9. Lalit K. Loomba provides two compelling examples:
Consider the example of a landlord who owns property in a city. He knows that drug
trafficking is taking place in his building. He does his best to stop the activity: he bolts
the doors and calls the police. It would be unfair to disallow such a landlord innocent
owner status merely because he knew about the drug dealing. Likewise consider a person
whose spouse is selling drugs from their jointly-owned home.[Citation omitted.] The per-
son knows about the drug dealing and tries to convince his or her spouse to discontinue
the practice, and perhaps threatens to call the authorities. It would be unfair to deny
such a person the chance to attain innocent owner status simply based on their [sic]
knowledge of the illegal activity.
Lalit K. Loomba, Note, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property Forfeiture Under the Compre-
hensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 471, 486 (1989).
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defense are outside the scope of this article, it is clear enough that the circuit split does
not promote the ends of justice.
The split is also pernicious because it creates a general air of uncertainty. In the
absence of more definitive authority, residents of the "majority" circuits cannot rest
assured that they will have the continuing benefit of the current standard. This might
encourage people who are aware of narcotics violations on their property to ignore
them in an effort to establish lack of knowledge, rather than admitting that they know
about the problem and making a bona fide effort to remedy it. The uncertainty also
encourages those circuits which have not committed to one side to remain neutral.
Although their position is understandable in the absence of directives from Congress or
the Supreme Court, their indecisiveness, when the "knowledge or consent" question is
a vital part of a case, does not best serve the interests of the parties before it. Some
degree of certainty must be established as to the innocent owner defense to ameliorate
such potential problems.
What all of this suggests is that Congress should provide the judiciary with a
directive so that the courts may align themselves with the Act's true intent and in-
crease certainty and fair outcomes.
II. THE ARGUMENTS
A. "Consent and Knowledge are Separate Considerations:" The Third Circuit's
Approach
The case most often cited as typifying the majority approach is United States v.
6109 Grubb Rd."0 In this case, the defendant's wife sought to demonstrate innocent
ownership. The district court found that her failure to prove lack of knowledge pre-
cluded her from showing her "innocence" by demonstrating a lack of consent. After an
extensive discussion reviewing legislative history, forfeiture law in general, and canons
of statutory construction, the Third Circuit adopted the approach used by a New York
federal district court." Namely, that knowledge and consent are two separate issues.
This outcome rested primarily on the "canons" argument by which the Liberty Avenue
court had reached its decision.
Most courts which have decided whether knowledge and consent should receive
separate consideration agree with the result reached in Grubb Rd. 2 The Grubb Rd.
analysis has also garnered a great deal of scholarly support. Several commentators feel
that construing knowledge and consent separately is the only sound conclusion as a
matter of policy. One commentator has found the "canons" rationale of the Liberty
Avenue court essentially flawed, feeling that policy alone justifies the outcome. 3 0th-
10. 886 F.2d 618 (3rd Cir. 1989).
11. United States v. 171-02 Liberty Avenue, 710 F.Supp. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
12. See, e.g., United States v. 710 Main Street, 744 F.Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States
v. 755 Forest Road, 985 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. 14307 Four Lakes Drive, I F.3d.
1242 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. 60 Acres, 727 F.Supp. 1414 (N.D. Ala. 1990) ("This court sees
no reason why the Eleventh Circuit should not follow the Third Circuit, which, in turn, followed the
Eastern District of New York in 171-02 Liberty Avenue and gave the disjunctive word, 'or,' its ordi-
nary meaning." Id. at 1419.).
13. Essentially, Loomba's dispute with the Liberty Avenue analysis centers on two points. For one,
he opines that "[a] strict logical interpretation of the innocent owner language in § 881(a)(7) requires
a different result from that obtained in Liberty Avenue." Loomba, supra note 9 at 480. Secondly, he
feels that the court perhaps erred in its reliance on certain standards of statutory construction. Id. at
19941
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ers have explored the relation of the problem to the tenancy-by-the-entirety conflict,
essentially supporting a separate construction of "knowledge" and "consent." 4 One
has concentrated on the special effect the problem poses for indigents. 5 Yet others, in
criticizing the real property forfeiture scheme more generally, implicitly support any
approach which would minimize unjust forfeitures. 6
B. "Knowledge Equals Consent": The Ninth Circuit's Approach
In United States v. Lot 111-B Tax Map Key, 4-4-03-71(4)," a landowner who
knew of illegal activities occurring on his property attempted to establish his innocent
owner defense by showing lack of consent. The Ninth Circuit considered as its primary
source the legislative history of the statute, finding that the congressional policy behind
it was an "intent ... to seize all property that has a 'substantial connection' to the
illegal drug activity."' 8 The court felt that "[tihis policy would be substantially under-
cut if persons who were fully aware of the illegal connection or source of their proper-
ty were permitted to reclaim the property as 'innocent' owners."' 9 Thus, the court
reasoned that "[blecause [landowner] Stage knew of the illegal activities, his assertion
of lack of consent was of no consequence."'2
Commentators have observed that Tax Map Key's analysis of the legislative
history has merit. For example, Mr. Zajac2 has noted that "[a]n examination of §
881(a)(7)'s legislative history finds some support for the posture assumed by the court
of appeals."22 Zajac examined quotes from the sparse legislative history, and deter-
mined that it is certainly possible to interpret them as leading to the Tax Map Key
court's outcome. Another commentator agrees that Congress' most direct statement
concerning the innocent owner defense23 "[oln its face ... indicates that either
481. He nevertheless concludes that "While property rights must be respected, so must society's right
to combat the drug trade. The proposed approach [including, inter alia, the separate consideration of
knowledge and consent] balances the interests of property owners with society's interests, which en-
sures that real property forfeiture will continue to be an effective weapon in the war against drugs. Id.
at 492.
14. See, e.g., Zajac, infra note 22. See also Diana Vondra Carrig, Criminal Law - Forfeiture -
Third Circuit Holds Government is Entitled to Forfeiture of Property Despite One Spouse's Innocent
Owner Defense, 37 VILL. L. REv. 996 (1992). This article does not directly deal with the knowledge-
consent dispute, but does arrive at what it considers a "workable solution" between the government's
war on drugs and the "innocent owner's" interest in spousal situations. As noted by Zajac and
Loomba, the spouse of a drug dealer may be hard put to plead lack of knowledge, but she may in-
deed not have consented. By advocating protection of such spouses' interest in property, this article
appears to indirectly support the establishment of the innocent owner defense by lack of consent alone.
15. See, e.g., Jack Yoskowitz, The War on the Poor: Civil Forfeiture of Public Housing, 25
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 567 (1992).
16. See, e.g., Steffanie Stracke, The Criminal Activity Forfeiture Act: Replete With Constitutional
Violations, 57 Mo. L. REV. 909 (1992) and Ron Champoux, Real Property Forfeiture Under Federal
Drug Laws: Does the Punishment Outweigh the Crime?, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L. QUART. 247 (1992).
17. 902 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1990).
18. Id. at 1445 (citing Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles II and III, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess..
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9510, 9522-23).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Mr. Eric Zajac is an associate at the Philadelphia law firm of Kosseff & Chaiken.
22. Eric G. Zajac, Tenancies by the Entirety and Federal Civil Forfeiture Under the Crime Abuse
Prevention and Control Act: A Clash of Titans, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 553, 569 (1993).
23. Congress stated that "property would not be subject to forfeiture unless the owner of such
property knew or consented to the fact" that the property was connected with narcotics activity. Joint
Explanatory Statement of Titles II and III to the Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, 124 Cong. Rec.
[Vol. 20:81
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knowledge of or consent to the proscribed act would result in forfeiture."24 Signifi-
cantly, however, a number a legal commentators have concluded that Tax Map Key as
a policy matter was wrongly decided. In support, they offer several examples of how
equating knowledge with consent can result in unconscionable outcomes.'
The vast majority of courts agree, for various reasons, that knowledge and con-
sent should be considered separately. In fact, it appears that only two opinions, one of
which is a dissent, support the outcome arrived at by the Tax Map Key court.26
III. THE NECESSARY STATUTORY REVISIONS
Since the legislative history is sparse and indefinite, the Tax Map Key approach
does not rest on a solid foundation. Moreover, as several commentators have cogently
demonstrated, it is unsound as a policy matter primarily because it is quite capable of
producing unconscionable results. Aside from this consideration, there is the concern,
mentioned earlier, that landowners under the Tax Map Key approach will try to deny
knowledge in order to avoid liability, rather than admitting knowledge and attempting
to rectify the situation. Congress could not have meant for the anomalous results that
derive from the "knowledge equals consent" rationale.
The majority approach, on the other hand, has not only been accepted by several
judges and scholars, but comports better with the ends of justice and fairness. Owners
who acquire knowledge before they have a reasonable opportunity to act upon it will
not be penalized." Likewise, the sensitive situation in which one spouse seeks to per-
suade another to cease narcotics transactions" will be treated more fairly and more
realistically. It strains the concept of marriage, both as a matter of fairness and of
reality, to think that one will immediately "turn in" her spouse before attempting less
drastic ways of dealing with the spouse's criminal activity. More generally, it simply
seems inimical to one's sense of fairness to penalize a person in such a draconian
manner for mere knowledge of crime. In short, the majority approach is the superior
one, and Congress should amend the statute clearly indicating that knowledge and
consent must receive independent consideration.
S17647 (1978).
24. Loomba, supra note 9 at 484.
25. See, e.g., Loomba, supra note 9. Zajac offers similar scenarios for consideration:
Forfeiture upon knowledge alone can lead to an unconscionable result if the owner ac-
quires knowledge of illegal use but has no reasonable opportunity to act on it prior to
governmental seizure. If, for example, a landlord is informed by a tenant in a multi-unit
apartment building that another tenant is selling crack cocaine out of his apartment, and
the landlord quickly begins to investigate the allegation, he could see his interest in the
building immediately forfeitable upon seizure whether he has had any chance to contact
the authorities. A similar result would occur with a wife who finds out for the first time
that her husband is selling drugs from the marital home but who has had no real oppor-
tunity to act on that knowledge before seizure. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit did not have to answer these tougher questions when it decided Tax Map Key.
Zajac, supra note 22 at 571.
26. See United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1989) (Greenberg, J., dissenting)
and United States v. Keeton Heights Subdivision, 869 F.2d 942 (6th Cir. 1989). Judge Greenberg in
Grubb Rd. based his conclusion not only on the legislative history, but also on canons of statutory
construction (which he viewed differently from the majority) and the in rem nature of a civil property
forfeiture. The Keeton Heights court found that a spouse who knew of illegal drug uses of her
husband's jointly owned property need not have "specific knowledge of the particular acts" at issue to
lose her potential innocent owner status.
27. See, e.g., Zajac, supra note 25.
28. id.
1994]
Journal of Legislation
Zajac has suggested "simply... expunging the word 'knowledge' from the stat-
ute."29 As he cogently explains, doing so would preclude courts from considering
knowledge as an independent basis of forfeiture. He points out that, since one cannot
consent to something one does not know about, removing the word "knowledge"
would not preclude all consideration of the element. It would simply preclude its con-
sideration on an individual basis, thereby eliminating the problem which has divided
the circuits.
The courts, however, have already managed to create confusion out of one seem-
ingly simple phrase - "knowledge or consent". Perhaps the courts need a clearer direc-
tive than the simple removal of the word "knowledge" - for example, the insertion of a
sentence such as, "Knowledge alone shall not preclude an owner from attempting to
establish an innocent owner defense by demonstrating his lack of consent." While not
as simple, this revision is perhaps more forceful; it also states on its face that knowl-
edge alone does not nullify the defense. The revision suggested by Zajac might suffice
to clarify the question. Considering the current state of affairs, however, one cannot be
too sure. The longer revision, although it lacks conciseness, would state the congressio-
nal intent more clearly, and it is this revision which should probably be adopted.
Of course either of these two possibilities would result in more certainty than
currently exists and would also better serve the ends of justice and equity. It might be
next to impossible for a landowner to deny knowledge, but, as one attorney put it,
"that's a far different cry from saying that you approve of it, and that you consented
with [sic] it, and that you agreed with it, and that you joined it. There's a big differ-
ence."' The attorney was right, and Congress could not have meant to encourage the
results that flow from the opposite contention. Congress should, therefore, revise the
statute to clarify its intent and enable all courts to apply it as it was intended to be
applied.
Kirsten M. Dunne*
29. Zajac, supra note 22 at 571.
30. United States v. Sonny Mitchell Center, 934 F.2d 77, 78-79 (5th Cir. 1991). Incidentally,
although the Fifth Circuit claims to have no opinion on the question, it found for the landowners on
the issue of consent, and was even willing to apply their lack of consent as to one tract of land to
seven other tracts. This appears to evince a willingness to allow lack of consent, regardless of knowl-
edge, to establish an owner as "innocent" under the relevant statute.
* B.B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1992; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School. 1995.
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